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Federalist Society Roundtable Discussion'
MR. OLSON: The purpose of today's roundtable discussion is to explore
the topic, "Do We Have a Conservative Supreme Court?" Before our four
distinguished panelists address this question, however, we should consid-
er briefly the present members of the Court, who appointed them, what
the Court has done during the past forty years, and what it has been doing
lately.
The Warren Court (1953-69) produced scores of opinions that changed
the face of America. Among its most significant decisions, the Court
ordered school desegregation,' excluded the use of unlawfully obtained
evidence in state criminal cases,' expanded the right to counsel' and the
right against self-incrimination,s articulated the one-man/one-vote stan-
dard for reapportionment cases,' recognized new rights to travel' and to
privacy in matters of birth control and marriage," expanded congressional
power over private transactions under the Commerce Clause,' prohibit-
ed prayer in public schools, expanded First Amendment rights of press
and association," and struck down state death penalty statutes under
the Eighth Amendment."
1. This discussion took place at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on Octo-
ber 12, 1993. The participants were Timothy Dyk of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in Wash-
ington, D.C.; Robert Bork of the American Enterprise Institute; Nadine Strossen of the
American Civil Liberties Union; John McGinnis of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law; and Theodore B. Olson of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington, D.C. For
additional information on the participants, see pp. 127-28 below.
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
10. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
11. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The Burger Court (1969-86) also was notably active in expanding
rights and remedies for discrimination," bolstering restrictions on gov-
ernmental involvement with religious beliefs under the Establishment
Clause," extending constitutional protections to aliens,s embracing reverse
discrimination,6 and enlarging the right of privacy to include abortion
and the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons."
One obvious difference between the Rehnquist Court and its immedi-
ate predecessor, the Burger Court, is that they reflect different generations.
In 1985, just prior to Chief Justice Burger's resignation, there were five
Justices on the Supreme Court who were 78 years of age or older. The
average age of the Justices in 1986 was 72, and their average tenure on
the Court at that time was 17 years.
Since Chief Justice Burger's resignation in 1986, five new Justices have
been appointed-Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Gins-
burg. The average age now is 57 rather than 72, and the average tenure
on the Court has gone from 17 years to about nine years.
Eight of the nine Justices on the current Court were appointed by Repub-
licans. Indeed, during the forty years since President Eisenhower appoint-
ed Earl Warren in 1953, Democratic presidents have appointed only five
Justices. Justice Ginsburg is serving her first Term. Two of the other four,
Justices Goldberg and Fortas, served less than five years each. Of the
two remaining Democratic appointees-Justices White and Marshall-
only one was considered by most commentators to be a liberal. In short,
Republican Presidents have dominated the appointment process during
the previous forty Supreme Court Terms, appointing 18 of 22 (82%) of
the Justices, including all three of the Chief Justices during that period.
Have all these recent Republican appointees made the Supreme Court
a "conservative" institution? That is what we are here today to discuss.
But allow me to preface the discussion with some additional perspective.
In the last few years the Rehnquist Court: struck down a law making it
a crime to burn the American flag;" held that a public high school grad-
uation benediction violated the Establishment Clause; refused to strike
down, and indeed reaffirmed, Roe v. Wade, in opinions endorsed by five
Justices who were Republican appointees;20 expanded the entrapment
13. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1976).
15. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
16. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
19. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
20. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 114 S. Ct. 909 (1992).
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defense in a federal child pornography case;1 held that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause could be used by prisoners to sue for mis-
treatment by prison guards even absent serious injury22 and last Term held
that the Clause could be invoked by a prisoner complaining he was housed
with a chain smoker;23 held that one community's restrictions on animal
sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment;24 scru-
tinized the use of criminal forfeiture statutes by law enforcement agen-
cies under the Excessive Fines Clause;23 and raised questions regarding the
validity of unusually drawn redistricting plans that created legislative dis-
tricts packed with minority voters.
Are these the decisions of a conservative court? How many of the con-
troversial decisions of the Warren Court have been overruled? If this is a
conservative court, what is keeping much of the Warren Court's jurispru-
dence alive? To discuss these and other fascinating issues, we have four
outstanding panelists: Timothy Dyk is a member of the Washington, D.C.,
office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. He graduated from Harvard Law
School and served as a law clerk to three Justices on the United States
Supreme Court-Justices Reed and Burton, and Chief Justice Warren. He
has taught law at Georgetown, Yale, and the University of Virginia. He
is a well-known and highly respected litigator and an expert on ques-
tions involving constitutional and administrative law, particularly as they
relate to the media and the First Amendment.
Judge Robert Bork is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. A
University of Chicago Law School graduate, Judge Bork has been a part-
ner at Kirkland & Ellis, a professor at Yale Law School, Solicitor Gener-
al of the United States, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, and President Reagan's nominee to the
Supreme Court. He is a trustee of the sponsor of today's program, the
Federalist Society.
Professor Nadine Strossen is national president of the American Civil
Liberties Union, a position she has held since 1991. A magna cum laude
graduate of Harvard Law School, Professor Strossen teaches constitu-
tional law, international human rights, and appellate advocacy at New
York Law School. She has also taught at Columbia University and New
York University.
21. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
22. Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
23. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). The Court's recent Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence will be discussed at greater length in Gregory Katsas' article in the next
volume of The Public Interest Law Review. - Editors' note.
24. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
25. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
26. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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Our fourth panelist is Professor John McGinnis, yet another Harvard
Law School graduate. Professor McGinnis teaches antitrust, constitu-
tional law, and international transactions at Cardozo Law School, Yeshi-
va University in New York. He previously served as an Attorney Adviser
and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel in
the Department of Justice.
Let us begin by considering the potential impact of ideology within the
different units of our federal judiciary. In particular, is a trial or interme-
diate appellate court judge more or less inhibited than a Supreme Court
Justice from judging according to his own personal, philosophical, or polit-
ical predilections?
MR. DYK: Obviously the federal courts of appeals and trial courts and
the state courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent. To the extent that
those courts are not bound by precedent, though, state courts and lower
federal courts have freedom to make law and, thus, to craft conservative,
liberal, or moderate jurisprudence. So the questions we explore today do
not apply simply to the Supreme Court, but are relevant in considering
the business of state courts and lower federal courts as well.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Before addressing the question, I would like
to suggest that Mr. Olson's introduction was not neutral. Some of the
Court's cases were pejoratively described. When Mr. Olson mentioned
cases "embracing reverse discrimination," for example, I assume he is
talking about what I would consider to be "affirmative action."
Regarding Mr. Olson's question, I think the current Supreme Court
gives lower courts an unusual amount of discretionary power in many
areas of constitutional law by creating open-ended "standards" that allow
judges a great deal of room to inject their own value judgments.
The area of abortion or reproductive freedom is a classic example. Here
I would disagree with Mr. Olson's earlier characterization of Casey-
although the Court technically allows Roe v. Wade to hang by a thread
insofar as all abortion has not been criminalized, the Court also allows
lower courts to uphold any restriction on abortions, no matter how oner-
ous, so long as the lower courts conclude that such restrictions do not con-
stitute "undue burdens."
With such an open-ended and subjective criterion, lower court judges
are put in a position where they have a great deal of power to shape the
law, and many have exercised that power to terminate reproductive free-
dom for whole groups of women in this society, especially those who are
poor or young women, or who live far away from abortion providers.
MR. OLSON: To what extent is our investigation of judicial philoso-
phy relevant to the business of the lower courts in view of the vast reme-
dial powers that district court judges currently wield? In recent years, fed-
128 Public Interest Law Review
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eral district court judges have used their equity and remedial powers to
oversee the governance and operation of prison systems and school dis-
tricts or other municipal agencies.
JUDGE BORK: Before launching into the subject of the impact of
ideology on the lower courts, I want to digress for a moment to chal-
lenge Professor Strossen's attempt to distinguish "affirmative action" from
"reverse discrimination."
In Today and Tomorrow in America, which details what happened
when the leadership of America fell into the hands of the intellectual com-
munity, Martin Mayer observes that "nondiscrimination" became "equal
opportunity," which then became "affirmative action," which became
"goals and quotas," which is now "equality of outcomes."" So "affir-
mative action," while it might sound nicer, is the same as "reverse dis-
crimination."
Turning to our subject, a lower court judge has a great deal of free-
dom to decide cases based on his ideology or preferences, particularly if
he focuses on the outcome in a given case without writing an opinion that
seeks to change the law. A trial judge very often can control the findings
of fact in such a way that he avoids a Supreme Court precedent without
seeming to do so.
MR. OLSON: We all seem to agree, though, that the Supreme Court
is principally responsible for establishing the configuration of constitu-
tional law in this country. Let us turn, then, to the central question of
this program, "Do We Have a Conservative Supreme Court?"
Here is a sampling of some observations that other people have made
on this subject. David Savage of the Los Angeles Times stated in his book,
Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court: "The old
agenda is dead. The transformed Court no longer sees itself as a special
protector of individual liberties and civil rights for minorities. Those who
challenge the government in the Supreme Court are likely to lose."" Christo-
pher Schroeder recently said the Court is so conservative that "the dis-
agreements on the Court and about the Court are now entirely debates
within conservatism."" Judge Bork has suggested that we have gone from
a reliably left-liberal Court to a somewhat less consistent left-liberal Court:
"It is an unelected, unrepresentative, unaccountable committee of lawyers
applying no will but their own."30
27. MARTIN MAYER, TODAY AND TOMORROW IN AMERICA (1976).
28. DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT
(1992).
29. Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative Court? Yes, 1993 PUB. INTEREST L. REV.
127-46.
30. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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Do we have a conservative Supreme Court, Professor McGinnis?
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: I think we first have to define the terms:
what does it mean to be a "conservative" court? A conservative court is
an originalist court, one that interprets the Constitution according to its
original meaning. Originalism makes a court conservative for three rea-
sons. First, the values that the Framers laid down are conservative-the
values of property and freedom of speech, for example. They lead to a
good, spontaneous order outside of government. Property rights, for
instance, engender prosperity and freedom of speech permits the search
for truth.
Second, the Framers established a democratic form of government with
a system of checks and balances to prevent the state from being able to
disturb the spontaneous order built by property and freedom of speech,
at least in the absence of a substantial consensus in society.
Third, originalism is crucial to a conservative view of the Supreme Court
because it preserves the rule of law. Without originalism, the Supreme
Court becomes the greatest engine of social change and thereby disrupts
the spontaneous order afforded by private property and the other free-
doms protected by the Constitution.
MR. OLSON: Are you saying, then, that it is the process by which the
Court makes constitutional decisions that defines whether a court is con-
servative?
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: Yes. But in addition, there is happily a coin-
cidence that the original values in the Constitution sustain a sponta-
neous order of prosperity and truth-seeking that is the essence of the kind
of civil society conservatives favor.
MR. OLSON: Applying your definition of what constitutes a conser-
vative court, how would you characterize the current Court?
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: I think it is feebly and intermittently con-
servative because there are two other definitions of conservatism that con-
strain the Court in being wholly originalist. One is what I would call
"stand-pat conservatism" -that is, applying stare decisis time and again
such that previous mistakes are never corrected. The difficulty with this
approach is that it permits generations of nonconservatives to shred the
Constitution further without any correction by conservative successors.
By that logic-which seems to be embraced by some members of the cur-
rent Court-we inevitably march toward an increasingly radical Court.
The other definition is a form of judicial abdication-the idea that
judges should not intrude on society, regardless of the commands of the
Constitution. There is much to be said for that point of view in many areas
confronted by the Court, where the Constitution in fact leaves decisions
130 Public Interest Law Review
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to the other branches, but again, that approach is troubling where the
Court has failed to heed the original commands of the Constitution.
To be sure, there is emphatically a role for stare decisis. No Justice,
however, has adequately addressed the appropriate interplay between orig-
inalism and stare decisis-that would require an inquiry into the origi-
nal understanding of the role of precedent as a restraint on Article III
power. Surely a conservative Court's response, however, should not be to
simply and routinely rubber-stamp a generation of decisions that depart
from the Constitution's original meaning.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: I disagree completely with Professor McGin-
nis's characterization of the Court as feebly conservative. His discussion
reminds me of Ambrose Bierce's definition of conservative from the Devil's
Dictionary." Bierce says a conservative is a statesman who is enamored
of existing evils, as distinguished from the liberal, who wishes to replace
them with others. This Court is not conservative, but radical, in at least
three important senses. First, it is tearing up by the roots the substantive
values that have been entrenched in our Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Provisions of the Bill of Rights are the most fundamental principles that
the courts are to enforce. Yet, the Court is contracting the scope of these
provisions and is not reading the Bill of Rights according to its plain lan-
guage or original intent. There are numerous examples, but one that imme-
diately springs to mind is the Fourth Amendment, which used to protect
our personal privacy against unwarranted, unreasonable searches and
seizures not based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Court
seems to have read that language completely out of the Constitution-
we are all now subject to a growing number of different types of intru-
sive searches and seizures that lack any kind of individualized suspicion.
That leads me to a second way in which this Court violates conserva-
tive principles. Here I turn to President Ronald Reagan, whose vision of
conservatism was marked by, in his words, "getting government off the
backs of the American people." I thought that was a pretty good defini-
tion. Has this Court done that? Hardly. Government has insisted upon all
kinds of invasions of our personal rights, and the Court just rolls over and
plays dead. Consider, for instance, the warrantless, suspicionless, and ran-
dom urinalysis testing for drugs that is occurring on a massive scale. You
have to urinate in a bottle in front of a government agent if you are going
to keep or get a job in certain government agencies. No one has to have
any basis for believing that you have abused drugs, or, for that matter,
that anybody in your agency has abused drugs. This is hardly getting the
government off our backs. It is no different with abortion-this Court
has sanctioned all kinds of onerous restrictions that for all practical pur-
31. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICIONARY 16 (Peter Pauper Press ed., 1958).
131
Public Interest Law Review
poses make it impossible for a woman to make the most basic decisions
about autonomy for herself." This Court also upheld the so-called gag
rule that prohibited doctors and other health professionals at federally
funded family planning clinics from giving truthful, accurate, medically
sound advice to their patients." This is not getting government off our
backs, but putting it in our mouths and in our wombs, allowing it to
control the most private aspects of our lives.
Finally, there is a third way in which this Court violates conservative
principles. A court that is conservative in terms of judicial process exer-
cises judicial restraint. It respects precedent. It does not reach sweeping
issues of constitutional law unless it must. It defers to the decisions of
elected branches of government. This Court has violated all of these tenets
of judicial restraint. I will mention just one example-the issue of stare
decisis that Professor McGinnis raised earlier. During the Term ending
in 1991, this Court overturned a record number of precedents, far more
than any other Supreme Court had in a single Term of the Court. The
Rehnquist Court overturned six of the Court's precedents,34 one of which
was only two years old. The previous record number of overturnings in a
single Term was only two. As if tripling the record was not drastic enough,
the Court announced in overturning the sixth case that Term that hence-
forth it would feel even freer to overturn past precedents specifically in the
area of civil rights and liberties." That ruling led then-Justice Thurgood
Marshall to issue what was his last dissent, in which he said that the Court
was abandoning its traditional role as the "protector of the powerless.""
JUDGE BORK: I do not think it is sufficient to talk about there being
a liberal or conservative court. Nor would I classify an originalist court
as a conservative court. I think an originalist court is one that is doing its
job. If the legislation or a provision of the Constitution at issue in a case
calls for a liberal result, an originalist court will interpret it that way, and
if it calls for a conservative result, an originalist court will interpret it the
other way. There are judges, though, who permit their own moral or polit-
32. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
497 U.S. 502 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
33. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
34. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (overruling Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983)); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)); Califor-
nia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (overruling Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)).
35. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
36. Id. at 2625.
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ical philosophy-be it liberal or conservative-to enter into decision-
making. I think it is more accurate to speak of liberalism or conser-
vatism when referring to a judge who is being political, than to identify
an originalist judge as being a conservative.
That said, I think we have a Court that reaches moderately liberal results
in cases involving hot social issues under the Constitution such as sexu-
al behavior, procreation, and perhaps race. Unlike the Warren Court, how-
ever, which saw ideology everywhere, this Court is a rather straightfor-
ward lawyer's court when it comes to other areas such as business law,
taxation, antitrust, administrative law, and crime.
Regarding Professor Strossen's comments, I must say that I think the
death of the Fourth Amendment is a little overblown. There are some deci-
sions that I believe went the wrong way by allowing searches, but that is
not the general pattern.
Moreover, to give the abortion decision as an example of a contraction
of the Bill of Rights seems to me to be perverse. The fact of the matter is
that the Constitution says nothing about abortion or about any aspect of
sexuality or procreation. Like most topics, the Constitution leaves abor-
tion to the democratic process and the good sense and moral judgment
of the American people.
The abortion right simply was made up out of whole cloth; you can
read Roe v. Wade until you are blue in the face and you will find no prin-
cipled, coherent constitutional argument in there for an abortion right.
The Court's recent Casey decision fares no better. The joint opinion in
that case does not cite privacy as the reason why Roe v. Wade is not being
overruled. Rather, we suddenly have a new right of personal autonomy
and dignity. Nobody knows what that means except that a judge will fill
in those rights with his or her own moral philosophy, which will then
supersede our moral philosophy.
If you look at the present Court, I think there is at least one conserva-
tive. There are several mild liberals and several rather pungent liberals. I
would classify Justice Scalia as pretty much of an originalist. I know he
is viewed as a conservative, but I disagree with that characterization. I
think Justice Thomas may be developing into an originalist as well. So
you cannot simply ask whether the Justices are liberal or conservative.
Instead you should ask whether they have approached originalism in a
plausible manner.
MR. DYK: I have a hard time getting as excited about this subject as
Professors McGinnis and Strossen because I do not think the Court is as
important as it used to be. Part of the reason why the Court is not as
important is because, apart from the criminal area, it has not been mak-
ing very much new law. The Court also is not rendering very many deci-
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sions. It has cut back on its docket significantly, rendering some 100-odd
decisions each Term as opposed to 150 to 160 or so in the past. The
docket for the 1993 Term is already so light that the Court is frantically
speeding up the pace of briefing to have enough cases for the January
calendar. Additionally, I think the issues of greatest importance in this
country today-such as job creation and health care-are before the exec-
utive and the legislature, rather than the judiciary. These are not issues
that the Court can do anything about, and while you can look back to the
Warren Court and say that there were certain social problems then exist-
ing that they could solve-such as segregation, disproportionate voting,
or police brutality-most people do not think these are the problems now
before the country.
In the area of criminal law, however, I do think the Court is changing
the law. The Court is rolling back the decisions of the Warren Court and
is very radical in the sense of overruling a number of significant prece-
dents. I think there is a political motivation behind this trend. The Court
does not like crime, and to some extent it sees these decisions of the
Warren Court as having contributed to crime. But to the extent that there
is such a motivation for rolling back the Warren Court's precedents, I do
not think it is appropriately labeled as conservative.
In most areas of constitutional law, the Court is simply staying with
existing precedent. Even with respect to Roe v. Wade, I do not think it has
cut back as much as Professor Strossen has suggested. We might well have
a very different view of this Court, however, had it overruled Roe or if the
flag-burning cases had come out the other way. Roe and the flag-burning
cases reflect a moderate Court in the area of civil constitutional law.
There is one area not mentioned by the other panelists where I think
the Court is quite conservative-statutory construction. This area might
not excite many people, but it is pretty important since a large part of
the Court's docket deals with the interpretation of ederal statutes.
Justice Scalia's approach of looking at the language of a statute and
declining to consult legislative history has had enormous influence on
the Court. Even though it still looks to legislative history-as it did in the
Conroy" case last year-by and large the Court has adopted the plain
language approach. There is always reference to a dictionary, or two dic-
tionaries or six dictionaries, and sometimes these statutory decisions seem
like exercises in third-grade sentence diagramming. I consider myself to
be more of a moderate. I view those decisions on statutory construction
as missing the real question that needs to be answered-what was the
37. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562 (1993).
134
Federalist Society Roundtable Discussion
purpose of the law? The question of what the legislature really intended
seems to have gotten lost in this dictionary exercise."
MR. OLSON: Why do you view as conservative Justice Scalia's plain
meaning approach to the interpretation of a statute, but consider a pur-
posive analysis to be moderate?
MR. DYK: To some extent I am going with existing labels. The plain
language approach reflects the prevailing conservative orthodoxy. The
notion is that Congress speaks only through the words of the statute.
The only proper interpretive stance is to look at those words, figure out
their meaning, and ignore the machinations of the legislators who may
put things into committee reports or the Congressional Record that may
not reflect the views of the entire Congress. It is a mechanistic approach.
In fact, it is not very likely that individual congressmen read the statutes
that they enact all that often, or focus all that much on the words. I think
in voting for a piece of legislation a senator or congressman is much
more likely to read the committee report than the legislation itself. So the
committee report could actually be more reliable than the words of the
statute. I would consider the design of the statute and look much more
at basic purpose.
The Chevron" doctrine also seems to fit with conservative orthodoxy.
Chevron says that if a statute is ambiguous and a federal agency is charged
with enforcement of the statute, you look to what the agency has said and
how the agency has construed the statute. If the agency articulated a rea-
sonable construction of the statute, the Court goes with the agency inter-
pretation. I would give the Court much more responsibility for interpret-
ing statutes where these agencies are involved."o It will be very interesting
to see whether deference to the agencies continues now that many feder-
al agencies will be controlled by the Democrats some time in the near
future.
I would note that, as with the plain meaning rule, the Court regularly
ignores or follows Chevron as it pleases.4 1 But the plain language rule
and Chevron deference to the agency construction of statutes are princi-
ples that are nonetheless important.
38. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's influence on the Court with respect to the use
and abuse of legislative history in questions of statutory construction, see Gregory Maggs's
article in this volume.-Editors' note.
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
40. Timothy B. Dyk, The Supreme Court's Role in Not Shaping Administrative Law,
44 ADMIN. L. REv. 429 (1992).
41. Thomas W Merrill, Judicial Reference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969
(1992).
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I should mention the First Amendment briefly before concluding. The
Court has taken a very important case this year involving a First Amend-
ment challenge to the so-called must-carry provisions, which require
that cable systems carry local television stations. The Court will contin-
ue to struggle with this and other First Amendment issues. These cases
are going to be very important to American business and to the consumers,
and I think that in the First Amendment area, with the flag-burning
cases as an example, the Court has been pretty liberal."
MR. OLSON: All of you have mentioned the constitutional rights of
the individual or social issues in discussing the business of the Court. Pro-
fessor Strossen, in defining basic fundamental individual rights, would
you include rights to property, rights to contract, and other so-called eco-
nomic rights? Do these economic liberties receive the same protection as
the other rights you mentioned, or do you see the Court treating them dif-
ferently?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: The ACLU believes that the Court has a
special responsibility under the Constitution to protect fundamental indi-
vidual rights, which do include property-related rights enumerated in
the Constitution, and unenumerated rights as well. I would like to focus,
however, on Judge Bork's criticism of the Court for recognizing and pro-
tecting unenumerated rights. Of course the Constitution recognizes and
protects certain fundamental rights even though they are not specified in
the document. The whole reason behind the Ninth Amendment was to
be sure that the natural rights or inherent human rights philosophy reflect-
ed in our founding documents would be respected. Rejecting the doc-
trine of unenumerated rights would place you in very lonely company
indeed. To the best of my knowledge, no Supreme Court justice has refused
to recognize at least some unenumerated rights. Some of the rights that
most people consider to be fundamental are not found in the express lan-
guage of the Constitution, such as the right to vote, and the rights of asso-
ciation and travel, to name a few.
I further disagree with Judge Bork's assessment that the Court has been
protective of rights in the area of sexuality and race. Putting aside the
reproductive freedom area, this Court in 1986 upheld the power of the
state to literally intrude into the bedroom of a consenting adult couple
engaged in voluntary sexual activity." I do not understand how that could
be described as mildly liberal. The Supreme Court's decisions regarding
race are no better.
42. The must-carry decision is Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994). On some other recent First Amendment decisions, see Michael Greve's article in
this volume. -Editors' note.
43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In a series of decisions in 1989," this Court so badly misconstrued the
plain language and ignored the repeated interpretations of the Civil Rights
Act, that Congress was forced to remind the Court of that language and
of those interpretations by passing the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, as
Justice Blackmun said in his dissent from the Court's decision in the Wards
Cove case, one wonders whether this Court still believes that race dis-
crimination is or ever has been a problem in our society."
I also disagree with Mr. Dyk's positive assessment in the freedom of
speech area. While there have been some narrow victories, there also have
been some very severe losses. Perhaps the losses do not seem so insidious
because the cases were not as dramatic as, for example, the flag-burning
decision. At least two of the cases, though, have far-reaching consequences.
The first is Rust v. Sullivan, in which the Court upheld the so-called gag
rule on federally funded family-planning clinics. The rule prohibited any
speech about abortion but it allowed and indeed funded speech about
childbirth or against abortion. The Court basically carved out an excep-
tion to what has otherwise been a sacrosanct principle of First Amend-
ment law-viewpoint neutrality. The principle of viewpoint neutrality
requires that government never suppress peech merely because the major-
ity of the community disagrees with or is offended by the idea or the point
of view that is being expressed.
The Court evaded the principle by reasoning that when the government
gives money to a person or an institution, it may tie strings to that money
and those strings may include a waiver of First Amendment rights. The
Bush administration and now the Clinton administration have adopted
the Court's reasoning in other areas, including government-funded research
at academic institutions and government funding of the arts through the
National Endowment for the Arts. In a society where there is so much
government funding, the Court's exception could go a very long way toward
engulfing free speech protections.
The second case is the so-called nude dancing decision that the Court
issued in 1991.6 The Court did state that sexually oriented speech such
as nude dancing conveys important messages about sexuality and eroti-
cism that have been expressed around the world throughout history in
many different cultures. It then went on, however, to allow such protect-
ed speech to be completely prohibited by a majority of a community that
was morally outraged that some consenting adults were willing to pay
44. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
45. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
46. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
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money to see other consenting adults engage in this form of expression.
Such regulation may not trouble those who believe that it should be
within the majority's power to deprive the minority or individuals of
fundamental rights. I think allowing such "tyranny by the majority," how-
ever, is squarely inconsistent with the philosophy reflected in the Consti-
tution through our Bill of Rights. It should be the highest duty of the
Supreme Court to stand as a guardian of unpopular expression against
the will of the majority.
JUDGE BORK: I am always amazed to see how the ACLU presents
these cases. The first case Professor Strossen mentioned is Bowers v. Hard-
wick, in which we are told a police officer went into a bedroom, saw
homosexual conduct taking place, and arrested the person. The police
officer happened to be in the building legally in order to serve a warrant.
It was not a warrant for homosexual conduct, but he was there to serve
a properly obtained warrant and observed the criminal conduct. So Bow-
ers is not exactly a case of rogue police breaking down the door of a house
in order to arrest people for homosexual conduct. In fact, as I recall, the
fact that the police officer was there did not receive any attention in the
case. The case focused on whether or not there was a right to engage in
homosexual conduct, not whether there had been an unreasonable or war-
rantless intrusion by a police officer.
The civil rights cases mentioned by Professor Strossen are an odd
vehicle for attacking the Court as well. The Court was simply trying to
pull back a bit from the morass they had created in earlier case law. The
1964 Civil Rights Act says as plainly as it can that no individual may be
discriminated against on the grounds of race or sex, and at the time of its
enactment there was some concern that whites and males might be the
subject of discrimination. Proponents of the bill, including Senator Hubert
Humphrey, vociferously denied that such discrimination would occur. Yet
that is exactly what has happened. Quotas are permissible so long as they
advance the interests of minorities, but not otherwise.
Professor Strossen's discussion of Rust v. Sullivan is overblown. Under
the so-called gag rule, doctors were free to advise clinic patients about
abortion in any context except when the doctors were, in effect, on the
federal payroll.
As for nude dancing, I thought it was just hilarious that anyone would
think the First Amendment was even implicated by such activity. That
said, eight of the Justices actually wrestled with the problem; only Jus-
tice Scalia said that the First Amendment was not implicated.
I do not see why the public cannot object to nude dancing at a night-
club in much the same way that it prohibits indecent exposure. Indecent
exposure might well be an effective and striking way to protest some law
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or other, for example, but we surely would not consider setting aside inde-
cent exposure laws as violative of free expression.
In short, then, I do not think we have witnessed a series of terrible blows
to freedoms. The Court is producing results that often are mildly liberal.
MR. OLSON: Professor McGinnis, perhaps we could return to the
issue of property rights. Has the Court been as vigilant or aggressive in
scrutinizing restrictions on the use of property as it has with restrictions
on other freedoms? Or is there some disparity?
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: The Court certainly should treat all indi-
vidual rights that are mentioned in the Constitution with the same vigi-
lance. But it does not. Our Constitution seeks to protect property rights
through the Contracts Clause and several other provisions. Yet, the Court
had previously read the Contracts Clause out of existence, and nothing,
or at least very little, is being done by the current Court to breathe life
into the prohibition on impairment of contracts.
Fully enforcing all individual rights that are specified in the Constitu-
tion is quite important for protecting our civil society. Assuming these
rights are protected, people can be expected to naturally act in certain
ways, by creating and using property, or providing information to one
another, or exercising religious freedom. In doing so, the citizenry cre-
ates a very beneficial social fabric that thrives without respect to (and in
spite of) the government. The problem is that the Court has spent a great
deal of its political capital protecting rights that really are nowhere men-
tioned in the Constitution and that are not as beneficial to the civil order.
As a consequence, the Court ends up not protecting the rights that are at
the heart of civil order, and the rights regarding property and contract
provided by the Constitution just disappear. In the first fifty years of the
Court's history, the Contracts Clause was the most hotly litigated clause
of the Constitution. It is now essentially a dead letter, and I do not see
even the conservative wing of the Supreme Court doing very much to
change that. There have been some incremental advances in the takings
area,4 7 but none at all in the Contracts Clause area.
MR. DYK: There is one interesting twist with respect to constitution-
al protection of business and property. The Court has suggested that it
might apply stare decisis more rigorously in business or property cases
than in criminal cases. In fact, if you look at some recent decisions, the
Court seems to be doing just that."
I agree with Professor McGinnis, however, that the Court is not very
enthusiastic about inventing new rights to protect business. The Court
47. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
48. Compare Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1992) with Quill Corp v. North
Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
139
unanimously chose not to break new ground in the Contracts Clause area,
and they have not gone very far with the Takings Clause.
The great hope that business had from a conservative court-though
I do not think "conservative" and "pro-business" are necessarily the
same-was that the Due Process Clause might be used to strike down
excessive punitive damages awards in products liability and other cases.
That hope has been frustrated so far. In Haslip" and TXO,s0 the Court
found itself unable to create a satisfactory new standard, and as a result
there is precious little protection against excessive punitive damages
awards."
I also want to suggest hat there are some issues on the horizon for the
Court which are going to serve as baselines for identifying the Court as
conservative or liberal. The affirmative action/reverse discrimination issue
is certainly one of these. We already have seen two major decisions involv-
ing that issue, CrosonS2 and Metro Broadcasting." Title VII is going to
continue to be a very troublesome issue for the Court as well. The Court's
decisions in this area are going to have a major impact on the American
public, on American business, and on national life generally. I cannot offer
a prediction as to how the Court is going to decide these cases, but I do
not think that the proponents of affirmative action should necessarily feel
secure about Justice Ginsburg's vote.
JUDGE BORK: I agree that race and ethnicity are going to be the issues
of the nineties for the Court and that they are going to come back again
and again. These are very delicate issues. I am not speaking now about
what the Equal Protection Clause actually has to say about these issues.
Rather, I am saying that we could become a very angry and divided soci-
ety if the Court handles these issues in a way that simply cannot be jus-
tified under the Equal Protection Clause.
There have been very few societies that were multiracial and knew
any degree of peace. We had a terrible time adjusting relationships between
blacks and whites, and we have not completely succeeded yet. Now we
have other large blocks of people who are of Asian extraction or of His-
panic origins. In this new climate, the Court has the capacity either to
bring us closer to some degree of peace or to make the tensions that are
now escalating in this area even worse.
49. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
50. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
51. These decisions, and the frustration-ending Honda case, are discussed in greater
detail in the article by Messrs. Olson and Boutrous in this volume.-Editors' note.
52. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
53. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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MR. OLSON: So far, we have talked a great deal about the extent to
which the Court's philosophical orientation can be identified on the
basis of how it has treated individual rights, either enumerated or not,
under the Constitution. Let us turn for a moment to the more institutional
question of whether the Court defers to the other branches of the feder-
al government. In one way or another, each of you referred to deference
by the Court-to the written words of the Constitution, to the original
intent of the Framers, and to acts of Congress or interpretations of those
acts by the Executive-in discussing whether the Court is conservative.
In the nude dancing case and homosexual sodomy case, and in Rust v.
Sullivan, for example, the Court was deferring to the decisions of the states
and to an executive branch interpretation of a statute. What does this say
about the philosophical outlook of the current Court?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: On the issue of deference, I think this is a
Court that is not consistently adhering to judicial restraint principles.
Rather, it is a Court that is completely selective in when it chooses to defer
to Congress or agency interpretations of statutes.
The only pattern I can see is purely result-oriented: when Congress does
something that is protective of human rights, such as passing a civil rights
act or a voting rights act, then the Court finds it convenient to ignore con-
gressional intent. Conversely, when the Court is presented with an agency
interpretation of a statute that constrains rights, as in the case of Rust v.
Sullivan, it defers to the executive branch. Rust involved a statute that
simply talked about not giving federal funding to any agency that per-
formed or provided abortions. It is quite a stretch for the Court to say that
the executive branch reasonably interpreted that statute as extending to
any effort to supply information about abortions, when for seventeen pre-
vious years the executive branch had not applied such a twisted meaning
of the statute.
To take a contrary example, though, in Shaw v. Reno, the Court chose
to ignore the executive branch's rights-protective interpretation of a statute.
Specifically, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department argued
for a relatively expansive interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, but the
Rehnquist Court did not defer to that interpretation.s
MR. OLSON: When should the Court defer to the interpretations of
the executive branch? If this Court is being inconsistent, what principle
do you think it should follow?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: The first obligation in judging an agency's
interpretation of a statute is to ascertain what Congress meant, and I agree
with Mr. Dyk that confining one's attention to the language is not satis-
54. The Shaw decision is discussed in greater detail in Abigail Thernstrom's article in
this volume.-Editors' note.
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factory. There has to be some attention to legislative history as well. If a
statute is ambiguous and leaves room for interpretation, I would defer to
the expertise of the agency. But the Court's review of an agency's inter-
pretation should not be result-oriented.
Before concluding, I would like to shift gears and examine an issue that
has not yet been mentioned by any of the panelists-religious freedom."
The Rehnquist Court extirpated that guarantee a few terms ago in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith." The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
would be violated only in the unlikely circumstance of a governmental
body deliberately, intentionally, or willfully singling out religious people
so as to deprive them of their freedom of worship. The case involved the
free-exercise rights of government-employed drug counselors who were
members of the Native American Church and who had ingested peyote
in ceremonies during church services. Ingesting peyote is a central ritual
of that religion. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether
the state of Oregon could demonstrate a compelling interest in reducing
drug abuse that could not be advanced if it were forced to exempt the
ritualized, religious peyote ingestion at issue in the case.
The Supreme Court decided the case on grounds that were not the sub-
ject of briefing or oral argument and that completely recast free-exercise
law. In particular, the Court said that there was no need to consider whether
Oregon had a compelling governmental interest in inhibiting the free-exer-
cise rights of these Native Americans because they were not deliberately
singled out by Oregon's prohibition on drug use. The law at issue was of
general applicability, prohibiting the use of peyote by all Oregon residents,
and as such, the Court said, does not trigger the Free Exercise Clause.
This was a radical shrinking of religious freedom. Just look at the unusu-
ally broad coalition of religious groups, public interest organizations, and
members of Congress who have come together to try to restore the law
to what it was before that decision by endorsing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.
MR. OLSON: Are you at all comforted by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion just a few months ago that upheld the right of the Santeria faith in
Florida to engage in animal sacrifice?
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: I was certainly delighted with the outcome
since it was an ACLU case and our victory. But Lukumi was unusual in
that it fell within a very narrow class of cases that, under Smith, still
raise free-exercise issues-namely, situations in which a community delib-
erately targets a particular religious practice. Remarkably, such a legisla-
55. The Court's recent decisions under the Religion Clauses of the Constitution are
discussed at greater length in Timothy Flanigan's article in this volume. -Editors' note.
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
142
Federalist Society Roundtable Discussion
tive record existed in Lukumi. The law at issue had been passed precise-
ly when the city council was considering a land-use application of a church
that sought to engage in ritual slaughter. Interestingly, the town's laws did
not prohibit killing animals for any reason until this church sought per-
mission to operate. Then, suddenly, a law was passed that prohibited only
the ritual slaughter of animals.
Unfortunately, a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the nar-
row Smith test, and I doubt there are going to be many government bod-
ies that are so poorly advised by their counsel as to develop the kind of
record that existed in Lukumi. In the years since the Smith case was decid-
ed, Lukumi is the first free exercise of religion claim that has prevailed in
the courts.
JUDGE BORK: I do not think the Smith decision can be classified as
either liberal or conservative. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion, and what
he said was that the Court would not engage in a balancing test weigh-
ing the citizen's religious interest against the government's assertion of a
compelling need for restricting the religious practice at issue. Justice Scalia
held that if a statute is of general applicability and not aimed at religion,
the Free Exercise Clause does not come into play. Now I think that this
decision probably is inconsistent with the original understanding of the
Free Exercise Clause, but it does respect one aspect of Justice Scalia's judi-
cial philosophy-an aversion to balancing tests. He believes that bal-
ancing tests are inherently legislative. Thus, in areas such as interstate
commerce, Justice Scalia shrinks from examining allegations that some
state regulation constitutes an "undue burden" on interstate commerce;
instead, he looks to see whether the regulation discriminates against inter-
state commerce. An "undue burden" standard is more like a balancing
test than a bright-line rule.
Sometimes, as in Smith, I think the bright-line rule does some vio-
lence to originalism. But the choice to adopt bright-line rules is a judicial
philosophy, not a liberal or conservative political philosophy.
MR. DYK: Smith is an example, it seems to me, of a rather confused
jurisprudence. Justice Scalia's opinion is not quite as simple as Judge Bork's
analysis might suggest. The opinion suggests that the bright-line rule might
not apply in situations where both free exercise and some other right are
implicated. I therefore do not think we really can be sure of what Smith
means.
This brings me to a more general problem with the Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence-the Supreme Court's use of multipart balancing
tests in the constitutional area. This is not a terribly satisfactory way to
decide cases because the tests are very confusing, the Court has a very
difficult time seeing where the tests might lead in future cases, and the
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Court in effect ends up placing a legislative gloss on the Constitution
instead of simply deciding the individual case which is before it. This in
turn creates a number of problems for the lower federal courts and for
practitioners who are trying to figure out in some future case what this
multipart test might mean and how it might be applied. This is an area,
therefore, in which I think the Court's process has been undesirable and
where adopting what I would consider a more conservative approach
would lead to better results and, in the end, a clearer jurisprudence.
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: Smith raises the issue whether there is some-
times a tension between bright-line rules and originalism. Some original-
ists believe that the Free Exercise Clause is a mandate to government to
permit as much religious liberty as is consistent with the "peace and
safety of the state."" This view requires the Court to engage in balancing
in order to determine how far the needs of the state constrain religious
practices. Justice Scalia, however, believes that the Free Exercise Clause
is a more focused prohibition on government: it prohibits government
from adopting rules directed at religious practices." That is what consti-
tutes a law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion." Such a view would
permit a clearer test of constitutionality in free-exercise jurisprudence. If
the evidence for the contending views were in substantial equipoise, I
would favor the bright-line rule on other originalist grounds, namely that
a jurisprudence of rules rather than of balancing tests is generally more
consistent with the Framers' concept of the proper role of the judge, as
outlined, for instance, in The Federalist No. 78.
For the most part, however, multipart tests have reflected the Court's
common-law approach to adjudicating the Constitution. Over time the
Court devises tests that depart more and more from original constitutional
meaning. Moreover, the Court is not very consistent in how it applies the
tests. The Lemon test, which has no clear relation to the original mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause, now controls maybe forty percent of
the Establishment Clause cases; in the other sixty percent of the cases, the
Court applies some other test. In my view, constitutional adjudication
ought to be different from common-law judging, with the language of the
Constitution as the touchstone. The result will be fewer multipart tests.
MR. OLSON: Professor Strossen, does it bother you that these multi-
ple part tests allow the Justices, whether they happen to be conservative
or liberal, to decide a case based on their own personal predilections?
57. Michael W McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader
Interpretation of the Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 181 (1992).
58. For a full exposition of this view, see John Harrison, The Free Exercise Clause as
a Clause About Rules, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. PoL!Y 169 (1992).
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PROFESSOR STROSSEN: Of course that would bother me. The lan-
guage of the constitutional provisions with which I am centrally concerned,
however -the Bill of Rights and the post - Civil War amendments - is so
open-ended and delphic that it does not really provide answers to the ques-
tions that come before the Court.
People can reasonably disagree, for instance, on whether certain expres-
sion constitutes speech under the First Amendment. As an example, five
Justices thought that flag-burning is speech, but four disagreed. Whether
something constitutes an abridgement of speech can be a matter of con-
troversy as well. So I think in fairness we have to recognize that the
open-ended, ambiguous language of certain constitutional provisions
necessitates some sort of intermediating test that helps the Court decide
actual cases.
Having said that, the Court does seem to be shying away from broad
pronouncements of the law in crucial areas. Lee v. Weisman, holding that
prayers at public school graduation ceremonies violate the Establishment
Clause, is a good example. The Court did not, to the disappointment of
many conservatives, overturn the famous Lemon test, which is viewed as
guaranteeing strict separation of church and state. On the other hand, it
gave the test only the most feeble nod and did not in fact apply it. The
Court also stressed repeatedly the particular facts of that case, not giving
much if any guidance to lower courts and litigants regarding future cases,
which of course emerged immediately in the next graduation season.
Courts all over the country were split over the permissibility of gradu-
ation prayer. Some courts-including the Fifth Circuit-held that if there
is an election by a majority of the student body to have organized prayer
at a school-sponsored graduation ceremony, and an outside clergy person
is not leading that prayer, there is no Establishment Clause violation.
Some other federal courts-in the company of the ACLU-found
broader language in the Court's decision that would extend the Estab-
lishment Clause to such student-mandated prayer. The Court itself wrote
its Lee opinion narrowly enough that it is hard to tell how future cases
will be decided.
MR. DYK: I do not think the choice is between clear ules or original
intent versus multipart balancing tests. I want semi-vague rules with case-
by-case adjudication. The creation of multipart tests may have been a
response to an overwhelming Supreme Court docket in the past-an effort,
if you will, to decide several cases for the price of one. The docket is not
such a problem today, and I therefore think the Court could afford to
engage in more common-law judging in the constitutional area.
MR. OLSON: That brings us to the next question. Justice Souter has
been characterized as a classic common-law jurist. Justice Souter, along
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with Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy, authored the famous joint
opinion in Casey in which they stated that while they may have some
reservations about the Roe v. Wade decision, respect for the Court's prior
precedent is very important to the integrity and respectability of the Court.
Professor McGinnis, you have suggested that the Court will use stare
decisis in the controversial cases but will tend to be more adventuresome
in the areas where it will not attract quite so much attention." Please elab-
orate on that, and then I would like to ask the other panelists what the
proper role of stare decisis should be in Supreme Court adjudication.
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: I think there is a tendency for some of the
Justices, particularly Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, to invoke stare deci-
sis in politically sensitive cases that receive much public attention as a way
of showing the world that the Court is different from the political branch-
es. I have some problems with that approach to adjudication, because it
paradoxically makes ad hoc political judgments in order to avoid the
appearance of politics. I think Justice Souter, however, is somewhat more
consistent in his application of stare decisis. He subscribes to the Hart and
Sacks view-that stare decisis is always important in all cases because
the doctrine sharpens the distinction between the deliberative, rational
decisions of a court and the political, ephemeral decisions of a legislature.
That said, I do not find the Hart and Sacks approach all that persua-
sive. The real way to justify a constitutional decision and earn the pub-
lic's respect as a neutral arbitrator is to root judgments as far as possible
in the original understanding of the Constitution.
MR. OLSON: Judge Bork, is stare decisis a conservative methodolo-
gy in the sense that it reflects a cautious or incremental approach to change
the law?
JUDGE BORK: That depends on the kind of law to which you are
referring. Stare decisis has tended to be more important in statutory law
than it has in constitutional law. The idea is that if a judge misreads a
statute, Congress at least has the possibility of amending it to correct what
the judge has done. That happens from time to time. But if a judge is
wrong about the Constitution and has taken away the democratic free-
dom of the people by striking a statute, there is not much anyone can do
about it. Stare decisis also can have a ratchet effect in the constitutional
area, as Professor McGinnis mentioned earlier. When you have an activist
Court-as was the case in the Warren era-that cares nothing for stare
decisis and seems to revel in overturning precedents, and then Courts come
along that revere precedent, the law ends up constantly moving to the left.
59. John 0. McGinnis, The 1991 Supreme Court Term: Review and Outlook, 1993
PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 165-86.
146 Public Interest Law Review
Federalist Society Roundtable Discussion
MR. OLSON: What type of Justice is more likely to overrule a prece-
dent and disregard stare decisis? Professor Strossen suggested that the
Rehnquist Court set the world's record a Term or two ago when six prece-
dents were overturned, and you just said the Warren Court was promis-
cuous in overturning cases.
JUDGE BORK: My point was not that one Court or another in our
history was more or less promiscuous in overturning cases. The Court has
always overturned precedent. The Rehnquist Court may well have set a
new record in the number of cases explicitly overturned, though we must
bear in mind that the Court often overturns cases silently, without admit-
ting it. My point was simply that blind adherence to stare decisis inevitably
will push constitutional jurisprudence to the left.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN: I would like to underscore one point that
Judge Bork made in passing-the Court often overturns cases evasively
rather than directly. Chief Justice Rehnquist made this comment about
Roe v. Wade in his Casey dissent and Justice Harry Blackmun said much
the same in 1989. In his Casey dissent, Rehnquist said that Roe contin-
ues to exist, but "only in the way a storefront on a Western movie set
exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality."
MR. DYK: I just wanted to add some thoughts about a related point-
namely, that there is a conservative trend on the Court in getting away
from prospective overruling. The Court first abandoned prospective over-
ruling in the criminal area, and now, in the Harpero case from last year,
seems largely to have abandoned it in the civil area. I view this as a con-
servative trend.
MR. OLSON: I would like to finish off with a discussion of the con-
firmation process. Is the process affecting the way in which Justices decide
cases?
JUDGE BORK: The process now involves taking a nominee through
a series of endless questions about how he would vote in different kinds
of cases. I think it is an effort to elicit campaign promises from the nom-
inee to decide cases in one way or another. The fact that today's hearings
are televised merely exacerbates the problem. When Byron White was
confirmed, they asked him about six questions. When William 0. Dou-
glas was confirmed, he sat in the waiting room until the Judiciary Com-
mittee sent word that it was not going to ask him any questions. That is
unthinkable today, no matter how acceptable the nominee might be.
I think the current process does have an effect. If a nominee gives
campaign promises, it is quite embarrassing not to live up to them. Imag-
ine Justices regularly leaving a conference to check to see exactly what
60. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
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they said to the Judiciary Committee during their hearings. The upshot
is that certain Senators might come to control constitutional issues by
insisting that the nominee give certain answers.
The Court-not particular groups of Senators-should control the
issues.
PROFESSOR McGINNIS: The process makes it harder for original-
ism to be the norm for constitutional adjudication. In such a highly polit-
ical process, our culture has a difficult time distinguishing between the
process of reasoning-which is what makes a decision right or wrong to
an originalist-and politically oriented decisionmaking.
The hearings, in short, present a very inaccurate picture of the proper
role of the judge in society. The media also does a poor job of making peo-
ple realize that many of the cases before the Supreme Court raise issues
of governance such as separation of powers and federalism, not simply
moral issues such as whether we should allow abortion.
MR. OLSON: Thank you all for participating in today's forum. I want
to thank our panelists very much. You have heard the answer to the
question, "Is the Supreme Court conservative?"-yes and no.
Public Interest Law Review148
